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Very few topics get discussed more in theological discussions than freewill/determinism. And sadly, there are more important issues that get neglected. But, there is just enough misunderstanding and animosity on both sides, such that I decided to take a shot at addressing the issue.

To start, let's just do away with that term, "freewill." What does it mean? After all, what is the "will" free from, exactly? Or more aptly, what is it free to do? What is this "will" that we speak of?

I prefer the term "freedom of choice," as it is less ambiguous. The basic idea is that given a choice where many alternative options are available, we are not determined to choose any one option by factors external to one's decision making faculties. Or, as Plantiga said,

If a person is free with respect to a given action, then he is free to perform the action and free to refrain from performing it; no antecedent conditions and/or causal laws determine that he will perform the action, or that he won't...It is within his power, at the time in question, to take or perform the action and within his power to refrain from it.¹

This is equivalent to the position known as Libertarian Free Will. This is not to be confused with Determinism, which states that all of our choices are ultimately determined, such that we cannot fail to choose as we were determined to choose. This is also not the same thing as Compatibilism, which says that we only do what we desire (at best, I would call what they believe "freedom of desire"). When I speak of freedom of choice, I mean that we not only can choose to do what we desire, but we could possibly choose to do what we don't desire (e.g., I don't want to do the dishes, but I will).

(Since Compatibilism is based on much of the same grounding as Determinism, my critiques of Determinism will apply to that as well. The idea behind Compatibilism is that our choices are determined, but by something internal to us [e.g. our desires]. A sticking point of this, however, is that unless Compatibilists teach that desires are without cause, they are ultimately bound to our choices being determined by something outside of us, albeit indirectly. This is one reason why I don't believe Compatibilism actually compatibilizes anything in a meaningful manner.)

That does not mean, of course, that we are totally free to choose anything, or that we are free from any influences. Choices are certainly not made in a vacuum. Rather, I do believe that our choices can be influenced, and in some circumstances even coerced. Under usual circumstances, influences on one's choice are not determinative or coercive.

That said, there are several facets of this debate which make it complicated, but I'll restrict the scope here to some Scriptural and Philosophical arguments.

There tends to be just enough Bible passages on the subject for folks on all sides to support their position with sufficient haggling. I am aware of several passages that I can use, but only a few are clear enough such that they can't be reconciled with a more determinative view. I'll start with the whopper: As the ancient Jews were on their journey from Egypt to the promised land, God laid down the Laws which they were expected to keep. Towards the end of one of the books of the law, God gives Israel a decision to make, which would resonate for the centuries until Jesus Christ came. We read,

"For this commandment which I command you today is not too difficult for you, nor is it out of reach. It is not in heaven, that you should say, 'Who will go up to heaven for us to get it for us and make us hear it, that we may observe it?' Nor is it beyond the sea, that you should say, 'Who will cross the sea for us to get it for us and make us hear it, that we may observe it?' But the word is very near you, in your mouth and in your heart, that you may observe it."

"See, I have set before you today life and prosperity, and death and adversity; in that I command you today to love the LORD your God, to walk in His ways and to keep His commandments and His statutes and His judgments, that you may live and multiply, and that the LORD your God may bless you in the land where you are entering to possess it. But if your heart turns away and you will not obey, but are drawn away and worship other gods and serve them, I declare to you today that you shall surely perish. You will not prolong your days in the land where you are crossing the Jordan to enter and possess it.

"I call heaven and earth to witness against you today, that I have set before you life and death, the blessing and the curse. So choose life in order that you may live, you and your descendants, by loving the LORD your God, by obeying His voice, and by holding fast to Him; for this is your life and the length of your days, that you may live in the land which the LORD swore to your fathers, to Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, to give them." Deuteronomy 30:11-20.

If is a fact recorded in Scripture that Israel rebelled, and in essence they chose death over life in light of the above. In fact, God predicted that the people will rebel a chapter later (Deut. 31:16)! In order for determinism to work, the people must have only been able to rebel, and were totally incapable of obeying. Yet, read Deut. 30:11-20 again. God makes it clear that obedience was not impossible. Obedience was not out of the Israelites' reach; it was not in heaven nor across the ocean such that they were unable to obtain it. It was entirely possible for them to choose to abide in God's Law. (Those who challenge this point with Total Depravity in mind, lat it be known that it would have been necessary for God to grant them sufficient grace to do so. The fact that God even states it was possible for them to obey implies that He did give sufficient grace to do so, even if it isn't stated outright.) The only explanation available is that the people could have freely chosen to obey or disobey, and they freely chose to disobey.

There is another verse in the New Testament, which is similar. No temptation has overtaken you but such as is common to man; and God is faithful, who will not allow you to be tempted beyond what you are able, but with the temptation will provide the way of escape also, so that you will be able to endure it. 1 Corinthians 10:13. This is from the Apostle Paul, writing to the Christians in Corinth. It is interesting, in that Paul says God will enable us Christians to endure any temptation that comes along. Yet, Christians still sin, nevertheless. How can a Christian both be able to sin and be able to not sin, unless they were granted the free will to do so?

On philosophical grounds, folks on all sides get entrenched. There are so many issues in this debate that it is not practical to cover them all here (I may start a series if I must, but for now I think it is sufficient to cover the main points).

First, we have to deal with the notions of responsibility and culpability. While these terms are technically synonymous, for the purpose of this essay I'll be strict in my usage of these terms. For our purposes, when I speak of responsibility, I am referring to the strictly material relationship between cause and effect. An apple falls to the ground; one can say, in the sense I am using the term, gravity is responsible for the acceleration from the apple towards the center of the earth. Culpability, however, has more of a sense of moral "responsibility." If my actions resulted in an apple "dropping" and hitting a Calvinist in the head, I would be held culpable for my misdeed. One can be responsible, but not culpable (as in an accident, or a killing in self-defense).

The question is, if we are only able to do what we have been determined to do by external factors, are we really culpable for our actions? The implication behind morality and justice always seems to be, "you should do this," or "you ought not do that." Yet, if a person can only do one thing (e.g., you could only have given money to a person in poverty, or you could only act foolishly in a manner that resulted in an severe automobile accident), how can it be said that you should have, or shouldn't have, done it? "Should" or "ought," by their very nature, imply that one has many potential choices, some of which result in good, others result in bad. If I murder 30 people, you can't tell me I shouldn't have done that unless I could indeed have chose not to murder anyone.

We see this in our court systems. There are pleas, like temporary insanity, where responsibility for an action is not denied, but what is debated is whether the 'responsible' party was intentionally or morally capable of doing better. Cases of negligence are particularly controversial, even though the responsibility is often beyond doubt. The question is, was the person acting in a manner they shouldn't have, which indirectly resulted in an injustice? Or, was it just bad misfortune which the individual could not have avoided unless they foresaw the future?

The Bible grants no foothold for the determinist on this topic. In several places, Jesus goes beyond saying some will or won't believe in him: He challenges the people to! "Come to Me, all who are weary and heavy-laden, and I will give you rest. Take My yoke upon you and learn from Me, for I am gentle and humble in heart, and you will find rest for your souls. For My yoke is easy and My burden is light." Matthew 11:28-30. Jesus answered them and said, "Truly, truly, I say to you, you seek Me, not because you saw signs, but because you ate of the loaves and were filled. Do not work for the food which perishes, but for the food which endures to eternal life, which the Son of Man will give to you, for on Him the Father, God, has set His seal." John 6:26-27. Etc. In essence, the Bible says that we should put our faith in Christ. Yet, this has the implication that it is possible for one to believe, or not. (For those who appeal to Total Depravity, again, if this is so it implies that God has granted sufficient grace for the people involved to believe.) If Jesus really meant that some were predetermined to believe and others not, he should have said "some will and some won't," rather than "abide in Me" (John 15:4). It would have been more intellectually honest of Him, if freedom of choice didn't exist.

Now, freedom of choice would seem to have the opposite affect. Whereas we may not have culpability in Determinism, some would argue that Libertarian Free Will destroys responsibility. After all, it seems like we are saying that something is happening which is uncaused (since we deny that choice is caused, directly or indirectly, by something(s) outside of the "will"). If choice is "spontaneous," how can we say we are responsible for our actions, since responsibility carries the implication of cause and effect? Yet, if we aren't responsible for our actions, then we are not culpable for them. This is called the dilemma of Determinism, since it seems like there is no moral culpability regardless of whether freedom of choice or determinism is true.

Perhaps the solution resides in reassessing at our understanding of causality. Usually when we think of causality, we think of strictly physical events. A tree branch is no longer able to support the weight of an apple, at which point the apple is released and come hurling down, until it impacts with the ground. (Interestingly, if this apple instead hit a determinist in the head, he wouldn't hold the tree morally culpable, though he would hold the Libertarian Free Will adherent culpable if she hurled it at him. Keep this in mind...) However, the Aristotle, the Greek Philosopher recognized that this was but one kind of cause, where there are actually a total of four causes.² Efficient and material causes are the kinds which science analyzes, where physical causes have effects which change the system the scientist is looking at. However, the natural sciences aren't interested in the other two types of causes-- except perhaps crime scene forensics, if one considers that a science.

What we are interested in looking at is what was called the final cause. One good description of final cause, is that it is, "the end or purpose for which a thing exists, so the final cause of our house would be to provide shelter for human beings. This is part of the explanation of the house's existence because it would never have been built unless someone needed it as a place to live."³ This kind of cause is neglected by science, because something subjective like purpose or intent can't be quantified objectively. Yet, that doesn't mean this kind of cause doesn't exist; indeed, it is one thing to ask how my muscles move such that the gears of my bicycle rotate, turning the wheels which move me forward; it is another matter to ask why I am riding my bike.

This, I believe is where freedom from a mindless, irresistible process of cause and effect comes from. My actions are caused by my decisions, which are directed in part by desire and other internal influences, and in part by my intent and purpose in making something come about. When I say, "took a bike ride today because it was sunny outside;" I don't mean that somehow the sun caused me to ride my bike. What I mean is, "It is significant to me that it is sunny out, such that I make it important that I do some outside activity whenever it is sunny and the activity is feasible. Of all the activities I could do, the one I enjoy the most is bike riding. Thus, I make bike riding a priority recreational activity when it is sunny." Notice how I used statements of "value" or "purpose" in the above. I could place no significance in the fact that it is sunny out, and just stay inside and play at my computer or do homework. Of all the activities I could do, I could also jog, take a walk, or go on a relaxing country drive.

It is not clear, exactly, that final causes are themselves caused; nor is it clear that the need to be. Beyond internal thought processes, I am don't think we know what causes a person to have the intents, purposes, and values they do. Are those thought processes caused, and if so, by what? Interestingly, the more we learn about the decision making process, the more we realize how little we actually know about it.⁴ Christian theism muddies the water further. If God's purposes and decisions are not determined by something outside of His own purposes and decisions, it seems no more likely that our purposes and decisions are so determined. Hence, what seems to be a blow to Freedom of Choice turns out to vindicate it.

Finally, there is a practical application of freedom of choice. The fact is, I don't desire to do God's will. It's sad but true. Nevertheless, I strive glorify Him and love Him more deeply. Yet I am haunted by the flesh a la Rom. 7:8-25. If there is no freedom from the "flesh" ("flesh" not being the body, but a Hebrew idiom for sinful desires), then freedom to live for Jesus I may not have. Yet, I find freedom in Him. I examine myself, whatever I find that is good, I ask Him to bless so there will be more good; that which is evil I ask that He prunes away. Yet, if I have no freedom of choice, all my efforts in self examination (which is Biblically commanded explicitly in 2Cor. 13:5, implicitly in 1Th. 5:21) are futile. I am but a mere pawn, irresistibly thrust to and fro in a cruel chess game between the Spirit and the flesh. Yet, this does not cohere with how I understand myself. Perhaps that is the way it is, but in light of my experience, the burden or proof lies on the Determinist to show me I am honestly mistaken.

Therefore, because the Bible, both implicitly and even less implicitly, support freedom of choice, and the philosophical issues behind choice, morality, and causality actually support "freewill" over Determinism and Compatibilism, I am left to conclude that Libertarian Freewill is both Biblical and sound.

Interestingly, some lines can be drawn between my recent material on Arminianism and Personalism to this topic. From a Biblical standpoint, classic Arminianism allows a Christian to be intellectually satisfied in being a believer and holding to Libertarian Freewill, or at least more so than Calvinism and other "harder" theologies. Personalism frees the Christian from the strictly material causality the Physicalist is trapped in, without conjecturing a second substance and leading himself into the interaction problem, or worse: a damnable heresy.

Notes and Citations:

1. 1. Peterson, Michael, et al. Philosophy of Religion: Selected Readings. 267. Oxford University Press. 2001.

2. Kemerling, Garth. "Aristotle: Logical Methods." Philosophy Pages. Oct. 27, 2001. Apr. 28, 2004. <http://www.philosophypages.com/hy/2n.htm>

3. ibid.

4. An excerpt from Morely, Patrick (The Man in the Mirror. 192-193. Zondervan. Grand Rapids, MI. 1997.): "As important as decision-making is, the process remains mysterious and artful. Stodgill's Handbook of Leadership: a Survey of Theory and Research cites over five thousand research studies and monographs on executive decision-making. Yet, ts editor was unable to find one common set of factors, traits, or processes that identified the qualities of effective leadership."