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Often, I see Christians, as well as other Westerners in general, talk about the body and soul as though they are two separate things. However, a clear distinction between body and soul (or body and mind) is foreign from ancient Hebrew thought, with exception to some who were influenced by the Greeks. Substance Dualism, which is the proper name for the philosophy which views body and mind (soul) as two distinct entities, actually comes from the Greek philosophy which has influenced Western culture alongside Christianity. That isn't to say that Dualism is false for that reason: but keep in mind this question we discuss this, that is Dualism the proper Christian understanding of man, or is it foreign from Biblical teaching?

(I'll be using the terms "mind" and "soul" interchangeably, though they are not technically equivalent.)

However, the Greeks also thought that the physical world was evil and thus something to escape from. "The Epicureans held that body and soul are collections of atoms, finally dispersed at death (or shortly afterwords [sic]). The Stoics also were materialists; they held that after death the body becomes earth, and the soul returns to the central fire. The Platonists held that the soul is immortal; the Christians held that the whole human being is immortal, that the body will rise again - which to philosophers of all Schools sounded either ridiculous, or like a possibly interesting innovation."¹ This is why many Athenians sneered at Paul when he stated that Jesus rose from the dead (i.e. physically) (Acts 17:32), and why Paul felt it so imperative the we hope in a physical resurrection that he said our faith is in vain if the dead are not raised (1Cor. 15). More than likely, some in Corinth were holding to a synthesis of Greek and Christian thought, and thus held to a completely spiritual afterlife. While Dualism can account for a spiritual afterlife, it is not essential if our hope is for a physical afterlife, rather than just being spiritual essences floating around.

There is a problem with Dualism. This is called the the Interaction Problem, which notes that there is no way to account for how the body and the soul interact with each other. Is it a spiritual interaction, or a physical one? But, how does something that is merely material cause something to occur in something that is spiritual? It is one thing to say they interact, it is another to say how. This does not mean Dualism is false; however, if the how question is not answered, then Dualism as expressed is insufficient to account for how we can be thinking, mindful yet physical beings.

So why hold to Dualism? Some Christians seem to think that it is the only response to the Physicalism common with atheists and other skeptics. Physicalism, in the context of the body and mind, is the position that the only substance to man is the body-- hence it tries to resolve the mind-body problem by taking the mind out of the picture. There are two kinds of Physicalism: reductive and non-reductive.² However, both systems also have problems; J.P. Moreland does a decent job of outlining these problems, although he does so in an attempt to defend dualism.³ I believe Moreland doesn't go far enough, as he doesn't respond to the interaction problem, nor does he seem to be aware of Personalism. Nevertheless, his criticisms of physicalism are worthy of note.

Reductive Physicalism holds that the mind is just an illusory, and all that really exists is the body. The first problem for this position is that it does not account for the phenomenon that the physical events that make up brain processes don't have the same properties as a thought in the mind. I can think of a ball that has a property of being red, but the properties of the brain involve chemical and biological processes, which have little to do with the quality of "redness." The physicalist has to account for how the mental processes and physical processes can essentially be the same thing, yet have different, inconsistent properties. Also, this form of Physicalism is grounded in the idea that naturalism is sufficient to account for all aspects of reality. However, naturalism is grounded scientific inquiry: the process of the scientific method is not capable to of analyzing subjective things like intention or purpose, nor was it designed to. Naturalism itself is fine for looking at natural processes, but it is insufficient to account for intentionality or other subjective values.

Is Dualism really the only alternative to Physicalism?⁵

There is, in fact, another alternative, and it comes from the very roots of early Christianity. It is highly likely that the Bible writers and Jesus himself held to this view. It also seems that many early heresies were deviations from this view.⁶

The view I refer to I call Monistic Personalism (I'm sure there is a proper name for this view in philosophy, but I don't know what it is). Personalism is equivalent to what J.P. Holding refers to as the Semitic Totality Concept:

This notion combined aspects of the human person that we, in modern times, often speak of as separate entities: Nausea is thought of as a condition of the soul and not the stomach (Num. 21:5); companionship is said to be refreshing to the bowels (Philemon 7); and the fear of God is health to the navel (Prov. 3:8). This line of thinking can be traced through the Old Testament and into the New Testament (in particular, the concept of the "body of Christ") and rabbinic literature.

Applied to the individual, the Semitic Totality Concept means that "a man's thoughts form one totality with their results in action so that 'thoughts' that result in no action are 'vain'." [ibid, 60] To put it another way, man does not have a body; man is a body, and what we regard as constituent elements of soul and body were looked upon by the Hebrews as a fundamental unity. ^{7 8}

The idea here is, a person is one entity, a thinking body or a converged body and soul. Rather than the mind being a separate substance, or a property of the body, or simply nonexistent, it is but one aspect of a human being. Being physical is another aspect. This frees us from the problems of Dualism, since their aren't two separate entities trying to interact, and it accounts for the 1 to 1 correspondence of body and soul. This also frees us from the criticisms of Physicalism, as there is still a substantial reality to the mind even if it shares with the same substance with the physical aspect of the person.

And we find evidence of this view in Scripture. Consider Genesis 2:7 (KJV): And the LORD God formed man of the dust of the ground, and breathed into his nostrils the breath of life; and man became a living soul. Adam wasn't just "given" a soul, but became a living soul. What we see here is a synthesis of the material with the spiritual, as the body made from dust is made into something that is also spiritual in nature. Newer translations of the Old Testament, for the sake of clarity, translate it as "became a living being," but that doesn't do justice with what is meant here. Interestingly, the NASB betrays this clarification when Paul quotes this verse: So also it is written, "The first man, Adam, became a living soul. 1 Corinthians 15:45.

One difficulty with this position, however, is that it is commonly held that the body is strictly physical, while the soul can only be immaterial. In other words, the properties of these "substances" are contradictory to each other, thus cannot be one thing. However, is this understanding necessary? While the body is indeed material, such that it can interact with other material things, I don't see why it is necessary that a body is only material in nature, such that it cannot also have properties commonly ascribed to the spiritual. Likewise, does a soul, spirit, mind, or whatever have to be immaterial? While we as a society commonly understand it to be, I don't see why it is necessarily so. Christian readers of this, consider in the Bible where angels appear in bodily form, or where it is described that God "walked" before Moses. It is true "spirit" is typically considered immaterial, but perhaps we should reconsider if being immaterial is what makes spirit uniquely spirit, or not.

An analogy of Personalism can be found in the personal computer. In order to function, a computer must have hardware (CPU, Memory, Hard Disk, etc.) and software (the Operating System, BIOS, Drivers). Yet, there is no hard line to be drawn between hardware and software. Software is represented as ones and zeros on the hard disk. If you make a change to the software, it can affect how the hardware functions (e.g., you get a virus which bogs down your processor; a driver malfunctions and fries you CD-ROM drive). Likewise, changes in the hardware can affect the software. If you damage a hard disk, some of the information on it becomes useless. If you utterly destroy a CD-ROM, you lose all the software on it permanently. But, software and hardware are not the same thing. Hardware only functions as it is commanded to and within its designed limitations; software has a conceptual reality to it which goes beyond function. Because of the conceptual reality, you can interact with software through the hardware, and the software will react.

The analogy, of course, has its limitations. The human soul is irreducible such that I don't believe we can make a computer program that will ever mimic its capabilities. The software can be utterly destroyed with the hardware, but I believe that the soul exists in another state between death and The Resurrection (what that state is, I haven't explored in depth and is another monstrous theological discussion in itself). However, just as you can restore a computer to an earlier state, I believe that when we are Resurrected, one's body and soul are restored to a similar state as before death, except that instead of being imperfect, perishable, and common, our bodies will be perfect, eternal, and and glorified (see 1Cor. 15).

Because of the Christian hope, which historically has been not just in a spiritual afterlife, but also a physical Resurrection, I see no reason why Dualism is essential to Christianity. It has been a stumbling block as evidenced by early heresies, and may not be sufficient to respond to some objections by nontheists. Personalism, rather than Dualism, was the philosophy of Jesus and the writers of the NT, so I think if we really want to understand them, we should take on their view of humanity.

Notes and Citations:

1. Kilcullen, R.J. "Christianity and Greek Philosophy". 1995. Apr. 9, 2004. <http://www.humanities.mq.edu.au/Ockham/y67s10a.html>

2. Non-Reductive Physicalism is also known as Epiphenominalism, or Property Dualism.

3. Moreland, J.P. Scaling the Secular City. 77-103. Baker Books. Grand Rapids, MI. 2000.

4. See: http://www.theologyweb.com/forum/showthread.php?t=20227. Accessible as of 4/22/04.

5. There are in fact a few alternatives, like Epiphenominalism and Nonreductive Physicalism. However, I have not explored other alternatives due to lack of space.

6. Below are heresies which may have resulted from a melding of Christianity with some aspect of Greek Dualism. All of these examples can be found at:

Slick, Matt. Heresies. Apr. 9, 2004. <http://www.carm.org/heresy.htm>
Apollinarianism: separated Jesus into the divine (the Christ) and the body (the man).
Arianism: that Christ is the first creation and thus isn't divine. They hold that God is too pure to manifest on earth (notice the implication that the physical is "impure" or perhaps evil)
Docetism: that Christ only appeared to have a body (basically the flip-side of Arianism: where Arians denied Jesus' divinity, the Docetists denied his humanity. They held this view because they held that the physical is evil)
Gnosticism: while there seems to have been many variations of Gnosticism, they generally held that the physical world is evil and holds our souls in bondage.
Monophysicism: Jesus only had a divine nature.
Nestorianism: Jesus is two distinct persons.
Socinianism: Jesus was not divine by nature, but was a man who became deified.

7. Holding, J.P. "Was This Dip Really Necessary?" Apr. 9, 2004. <http://www.tektonics.org/baptismneed.html>

8. The material quoted by Holding is from:
Dahl, M. E. The Resurrection of the Body. Napierville: Alec R. Allenson, 1962.